

## COLONIA AUGUSTA PRAETORIA AND AUGUSTUS' COHORTES PRAETORIAE

*R. A. van Royen*

*Amsterdam*

The Roman colony "Colonia Augusta Praetoria" was founded by Augustus in the territory of the Western Alps, i.e. in the Poenine Alps.<sup>1</sup> Both the Western Alps—which include the Maritime, Cottian and Graian Alps—and the neighbouring Poenine Alps form the border territory between Italy and Transalpine Gaul.<sup>2</sup> The importance of this border territory differed from time to time for the Romans, as we can see from the manner in which the territory of the Western Alps underwent a process of development within the framework of the Roman territorial expansion in Western Europe. In the following an attempt is made to assess the extent to which the foundation of Colonia Augusta Praetoria can be explained in the light of this development.

Towards the end of the third century B.C. the Alps formed a natural boundary of the territory in Northern Italy under Roman rule.<sup>3</sup> This does not necessarily mean that the various tribes of northern Italy bowed to the same extent to the wishes and desires of the Romans: the Ligurians in the Northern Apennines and in the mountain areas north-west of Genoa as we know it to-day, for instance, were still more or less unbeaten,<sup>4</sup> whereas the Gauls in the lower parts of northern Italy did accept the Roman supre-

<sup>1</sup> G. Oberziner, *Le Guerre di Augusto contro i Populi Alpini* (Roma 1900), p. 23.

<sup>2</sup> H. Nissen, *Italische Landeskunde* (Berlin, 1883) I, pp. 146-150.

<sup>3</sup> T. Frank, in *CAH VIII*, p. 326.

<sup>4</sup> For the territory of the Ligures see T. Frank, in *CAH VII*, p. 805. From what is known about the battle waged between 238 B.C. and the beginning of the Second Punic against the Ligurians, the impression is gained that the fights were on a small scale (Zonaras 8, 18) and concerned the chasing back to the Alps of the looting Ligurians (Plutarchus *Fab.* 2, 1), or a single expedition through Ligurian territory (Polybius II, 31, 4).

macy.<sup>5</sup> This Roman influence in northern Italy was safeguarded by the natural barrier formed by the Alps against interference from outside.

The importance of the Alps as a protective belt<sup>6</sup> was determined not only by the geographical and climatic properties of the mountain area but also by the inhabitants who were masters in the art of spiking the path of intruders.<sup>7</sup> An enemy army encroaching on their territory—even if only en route to somewhere else—was confronted by the joint forces of neighbouring tribes who then proceeded to make it even more difficult for the intruders to negotiate this already difficult terrain. The extent to which the inhabitants of the Alps could endanger a passing army, emerges quite clearly from the descriptions of Hannibal's crossing of the Alps.<sup>8</sup> As long as the inhabitants of the Alps stayed at the periphery of the Roman territory and were prepared to oppose any intrusion of their territory, and since, moreover, the fight against the mountain-tribes in the difficult terrain offered little chance of success in the short term,<sup>9</sup> there was no reason for the Romans to conduct a systematic war against the tribes of the Alps. Furthermore, weakening the power of the Alpine tribes would also undermine the value of the Alps as a protective barrier.<sup>10</sup> Neither does history suggest that there were large-scale systematic conquests of a permanent nature in the mountain-areas of the Western Alps, shortly after the Romans had extended the scope of their influence to the foot of the Alps.<sup>11</sup>

The available documents show, however, that from 180 B.C. to 154 B.C. the Romans gained possession of the southern part of the Maritime Alps, after an extensive period of battle against the Ligurians.<sup>12</sup> The fact that the conquest was confined to this southern part of the Maritime Alps can be explained as being a result of

<sup>5</sup> T. Frank, in *CAH* VIII p. 326. For the largely reduced resistance of the Gauls in the Po-area, compare Zonaras 8, 20.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Florus I 38, 6: "... Alpes id est claustra Italiae ..."

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Diodorus Siculus IV 19, 4.

<sup>8</sup> See, for instance, Polybius III, 50-56, 4 and Livius XXI, 33-38, 3.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. the varying battle between Romans and Salassi (Strabo IV 6, b).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Livius XXVII 39, 7: "... duodecim annorum aduetudine perviis Alpius inter mitoria iam transibant hominum ingenia".

<sup>11</sup> See *infra* note 24.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Strabo IV 6, 3.

certain developments initiated at the start of the Second Punic War. The Roman army which operated in Spain from the year 218 B.C. was still in an advanced position in the year 180 B.C., as compared with other parts of the Roman Empire.<sup>13</sup> For the purpose of communicating with their outposts on the Iberian peninsula, the Romans were dependent on their shipping fleets with the risks and limitations inherent thereto.<sup>14</sup> Since communications between Spain and Italy was tantamount to maintaining the Roman positions there, and since the dependence of ships on the seasons was a great disadvantage, the Roman interests in Spain were best served by means of a permanent safe route over land.<sup>15</sup> At the beginning of the Second Punic War an alliance existed between Rome and Massilia.<sup>16</sup> We may therefore assume that the Romans were allowed to march across the territory of Massilia on their way to Spain.<sup>17</sup> The independence of the mountain-tribes in North-West Italy and the Western Alps, however, did not exactly constitute a guarantee of safe passage for the Romans between Italy and Massilia. By the year 180 B.C. the situation for the Romans had improved considerably following the subjection of the Ligurian mountain-tribes in the Apennines;<sup>18</sup> the link needed to complete the chain was denied them, however, by the inhabitants of the southern part of the Maritime Alps.<sup>19</sup>

Although virtually no information is available about the struggle to gain control of this last part of the route, we know that in the year

<sup>13</sup> B. L. Hallward, in *CAH VIII* p. 57; see also *infra* note 14.

<sup>14</sup> According to Livius, there still were troop-transports by sea (Livius *XL* 36, 10-12) between Spain and Italy, in the year 180 B.C.

<sup>15</sup> For the risks and dependency on the seasons for the navigation see L. Casson, *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World* (Princeton, 1971) pp. 270-272.

<sup>16</sup> H. G. Wackernagel, in *RE XIV* s.v. Massalia p. 2132.

<sup>17</sup> For the Massilian territory see *Westermanns Grosser Atlas zur Weltgeschichte* (Braunschweig, 1956), 2bII.

<sup>18</sup> The systematic and definitive subjection of the Ligurians in the Apennines belongs to the period 197 to approximately 180 B.C. J. Weiss, in *RE XIII* s.v. Ligurians pp. 533-534). Compare Livius *XLI* 16, 8; . . . "neminem cis Alpes esse hostem populi Romani . . . ."

<sup>19</sup> The subjection of the Intemelii and Ingauni began only around 180 B.C. (Livius *XL* 41, 6). According to Strabo *IV* 6, 1 these tribes lived in the southern part of the Alpes Maritimae along the sea-coast of Vada Sabatia to Portus Monoeci.

154 B.C. the resistance of the inhabitants of the mountain regions along the road had been broken.<sup>20</sup> It would otherwise have been impossible for consul Q. Oppius to march without difficulty from Placentia to the other side of the Maritime Alps.<sup>21</sup> This implies that in 154 B.C. safe passage for the Romans between Italy and Spain had become a reality. The Romans could now as it were burn their boats since they were no longer dependent on the sea as a means of transport. This connection route enabled the Romans to step up the transport of troops to Spain, which they considered necessary to suppress the revolts they expected to find on arriving there.<sup>22</sup> After the creation of this route—known as the Massilian and Ligurian coast road<sup>23</sup>—the Romans made no further attempt at conquests in the Western Alps.<sup>24</sup> Plutarch tells us that the Romans understood the advantage of allowing the inhabitants of this bufferzone to continue safeguarding their territories against interference from outside.<sup>25</sup> The Western Alps and their inhabitants continued to form a bulwark for Italy against attacks from abroad. This remained so until the sixties of the first century before Christ when the military situation in Western Europe changed radically.

In 58 B.C., Caesar was forced to stop the Helvetians from carrying out their intended migration to Gaul. He did not take the extra troops he needed for this purpose via the long-established Massilian and Ligurian coast road.<sup>26</sup> The reason for his not taking this road was because he wished to arrive with a strong army in the shortest possible time in the extreme north of the Roman Province of Narbonese Gaul. He considered this part of the Roman territory in Transalpine Gaul to be threatened by the Helvetians in their desire to find a new and better country.<sup>27</sup> If we are to believe Caesar, he took the fastest route from Italy to the threatened region, i.e. straight across the Alps: from Ocelum to the territories

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Strabo IV 6, 3.

<sup>21</sup> Polybius XXXIII 8, 9-10.

<sup>22</sup> Schulten, *RE* VIII s.v. Hispania pp. 2035-2036.

<sup>23</sup> Strabo IV 1, 12.

<sup>24</sup> Appianus *Ill.*, 15.

<sup>25</sup> Plutarchus, *Aem.* VI, 2.

<sup>26</sup> Caesar, *B. G.* I, 10

<sup>27</sup> Caesar, *ibidem* 11.

of the Vocontii, the Allobroges and the Segusiavi.<sup>28</sup> On arrival, he learned that the Helvetians were already crossing the river Arar on their way to their destination.<sup>29</sup> It has been established beyond doubt that Caesar crossed the pass of the Mount Genève, in the Cottian Alps.<sup>30</sup> Strabo mentions this route as one of the four important routes through the Western Alps.<sup>31</sup> Before crossing the pass, however, Caesar had first of all to drive out the Ceutrones, Caturiges and Graioceli (inhabitants of the Cottian and Graian Alps) who tried to prevent the army from crossing.<sup>32</sup>

In the late summer of the year 57 B.C. the legate Servius Galba was ordered by Caesar to create a new route through the Poenine Alps.<sup>33</sup> If we look at the route taken by Galba and take into consideration the tribes he fought, we can be fairly certain that the legate attempted to open up the route from the north across the Great St. Bernard pass. This he tried to do in the traditional manner of driving out the tribes who had settled along this route.<sup>34</sup> The significance of this route was obviously clear to Caesar: he instructed Galba to winter there if necessary.<sup>35</sup> Caesar's desire to open up the Great Saint Bernard Pass must be seen in the light of the conquests in Gaul in 57 B.C.

In the year 58 B.C. a number of tribes of Central Gaul, amongst which the Sequani, Lingones and Leuci, supported Caesar loyally in his fight against Ariovistus.<sup>36</sup> In the summer of 57 B.C. Caesar's campaign in Gallia Belgica was so successful, that he speaks in his *Commentarii* of a total subjection of this region.<sup>37</sup> In summing up,

<sup>28</sup> Caesar, *ibidem* 10.

<sup>29</sup> Caesar, *ibidem* 12.

<sup>30</sup> T. C. Rice Holmes, *Iulii Caesaris Commentarii* (Oxford, 1914), p. 12.

<sup>31</sup> Strabo IV 6, 12, for the Massilian and Ligurian coast road, the pass across the Mount Genève (cf. Livius XXI. 38, 5-6), and the route through the Salassi area. For the double pass in the Salassi territory see Strabo IV 6, 11.

<sup>32</sup> Caesar, *B. G.* I, 10.

<sup>33</sup> Caesar, *B. G.* III, 1.

<sup>34</sup> Galba was ordered to go inter alia to the territory of the Seduni and Veragri (Caesar, *B. G.* III, 1). It can be concluded from Livius XXI 38, 9 that the Mount Poeninus is situated in the territory of these tribes. For the identification of the Mons Poeninus as the Great St. Bernard Pass see F. Stähelin, *Die Schweiz in römischer Zeit* (Basel, 1948<sup>3</sup>), p. 344.

<sup>35</sup> Caesar, *B. G.* III, 1.

<sup>36</sup> Caesar, *B. G.* I, 40.

<sup>37</sup> Caesar, *B. G.* II, 35.

we can say that in 57 B.C. the whole of north Gallia as well as the adjoining part of central Gallia would be considered as occupied territory. According to Strabo the shortest route between Italy and these parts of Gaul was straight across the Great Saint Bernard pass.<sup>38</sup> Caesar's instructions to Galba concerning the creation of a route across the Great Saint Bernard pass and Galba's interpretation of these instructions are all the more easy to understand when viewed against this background. A passage from Tacitus' *Historiae* also confirms that the route across the Great Saint Bernard pass was indeed the shortest between the Rhine and Italy. The route taken in 69 A.D. by Alienus Caecina, a general in the service of Vitellius, crossed the Mons Poeninus, known today as the Great Saint Bernard; in doing so he was trying to lead his troops by the shortest possible route from Germania Superior to Italy.<sup>39</sup> The fourth important route described by Strabo passes through the Western Alps from Italy to Transalpine Gaul via the Little Saint Bernard pass in the Graian Alps.<sup>40</sup> We have no confirmation as to whether or not Caesar himself also made use of this route during his campaign in Gaul.

In the foregoing we have indicated the importance of the routes via the passes of the Mount Genève and the Great Saint Bernard in connecting Italy with the recent conquests in Transalpine Gaul. We must bear in mind, however, that Caesar's conquests brought about a radical change in the importance of the Western Alps as a natural barrier in the defence of the Roman Empire as we shall see in the following. From the moment that the Roman territory covered both sides of the western Alps, they could no longer be seen as a mountain-range which, being positioned at the periphery of the Roman Empire, made it easier to defend. In 56 B.C. Cicero himself points out to us in his speech "De Provinciis Consularibus" that the frontiers of the Empire now extended to the frontiers of Gallia Comata and that as far as he was concerned the Western Alps could now vanish into thin air.<sup>41</sup> The civil war which broke out after the

<sup>38</sup> Strabo, IV 6, 7 and IV 6, 11. See also H. L. Jones, *The Geography of Strabo with an English translation*, Loeb Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass. Vol. II p. 290, note 2.

<sup>39</sup> Tacitus, *Hist.* I. 61.

<sup>40</sup> Strabo IV 6, 7 and IV 6, 11.

<sup>41</sup> M. Gelzer, *Cicero: ein biographischer Versuch* (Wiesbaden, 1969), p. 169.

death of Caesar showed, however, that this was by no means the case: the Western Alps then proved to be very important in the struggle for Italy.

On 22nd April 43 B.C. Mark Antony left Mutina for Narbonese Gaul, where Lepidus had set up camp with an army.<sup>42</sup> We may reasonably assume that Antony who arrived some three weeks later (15th May) at Forum Julii, must have used the Massilian and Ligurian coast road only with the consent of Lepidus, since this route from Italy to southern Gallia Narbonensis was controlled by a detachment by order of Lepidus.<sup>43</sup> As soon as Antony was west of the Alps he was safe from Decimus Brutus who was following close on his heels.<sup>44</sup> Let us not forget that Brutus had no faith in his own troops, as his correspondence with Cicero reveals, and had always been uncertain as to whether or not Lepidus was to be trusted.<sup>45</sup> Brutus was not prepared to cross the Alps in pursuance of Antony especially since he feared that Antony would succeed in joining forces with Lepidus.<sup>46</sup>

It was a much more attractive proposition for Brutus to seek assistance from L. Munatius Plancus who had also pitched camp west of the Alps in the north of Narbonese Gaul.<sup>47</sup> Brutus had been in touch with Plancus for some time as we can see from the relevant correspondence.<sup>48</sup> As soon as Brutus had been informed that Lepidus and Antony had indeed joined forces in June,<sup>49</sup> he took the only logical step left—he crossed the Alps to Plancus.<sup>50</sup> By joining their armies in time, Brutus and Plancus ruled out any risk of their becoming isolated from each other and consequently becoming easy

Cicero, *De provinciis consularibus* XIII: "Nunc denique est perfectum, ut imperii nostri terrarumque illarum (sc. Gallia Comata) idem esset extremum"; Cicero, *ibidem* XIV: Quae (sc. Alpes) iam licet considant.

<sup>42</sup> R. Y. Tyrell and L. C. Purser, *The correspondence of M. Tullius Cicero* (Dublin, London, 1933<sup>2</sup>), Vol. VI p. 144.

<sup>43</sup> R. Y. Tyrell and L. C. Purser, *op. cit.*, pp. LII-LIV.

<sup>44</sup> R. Y. Tyrell and L. C. Purser, *op. cit.*, pp. LVIII-LIX.

<sup>45</sup> Cicero, *Ep. ad Fam.* XI 19, 1, XI 13, 2, XI 9, XI 10.

<sup>46</sup> Cicero, *ibidem*, XI 9; XI 10.

<sup>47</sup> G. Walser, *Der Briefwechsel des L. Munatius Plancus mit Cicero* (Basel, 1957), pp. 25-29.

<sup>48</sup> Cicero, *Ep. ad Fam.* XI, 11, 1.

<sup>49</sup> Cicero, *Ep. ad Fam.* XII, 10.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Cicero, *ibidem*, XI, 15 for the territory of the Salassi.

prey to the combined armies of Antony and Lepidus. To reach Plancus, Brutus had to lead his army over the Little Saint Bernard Pass, situated more to the north and, unlike the passes more to the south, not under the influence of Lepidus and Antony. In his journey through the Alps, Brutus had to pass through the territory of the Salassi in the Poenine Alps, who allowed him to pass only after he had made satisfactory payment.<sup>51</sup>

The strategic importance of the Western Alps emerged some years later in the same civil war: entrance to and exit from Italy was dependent on access to the Alpine routes. In 41 B.C. Salvidienus Rufus who had been sent to Spain with an army by Octavianus was halted by Ventidius and Calenus—generals of Mark Antony in Gaul.<sup>52</sup> Since Octavianus was not in a position to exercise any influence on this situation, he sent a deputation to negotiate with L. Antonius.<sup>53</sup> The only result of these negotiations was that Rufus obtained the guarantee that he could continue his expedition to Spain unhindered.<sup>54</sup> From the fact that Octavianus had to resort to diplomacy it may be concluded that trying to force a way through the blockade in the Alps was not a very promising prospect.

The difficulty of releasing a blockade set up in the Alps is confirmed also by a number of military actions in the battle between Otho and Vitellius. When Otho learned in 69 A.D. that the armies of Vitellius had reached the Alps and that the passes had been occupied, he decided upon the following strategy.<sup>55</sup> His strong navy had to land on the south coast of Narbonese Gaul while at the same time an army had to advance from Italy to the Massilian and Ligurian coast road.<sup>56</sup> Otho hoped apparently to overrun the blockade by a two-pronged attack and to get control of the route. Otho's decision to adopt this strategy serves to illustrate how difficult it was to dislodge an army settled along a route through the Alps.

Since we have seen how important the routes through the Alps

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Patsch in *RE* I s.v. Alpes p. 1608; Strabo IV 6, 7.

<sup>52</sup> Dio XLVIII 10, 1; Appianus *B.C.* V 20 and V 80; cf. Syme, R., *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1966) pp. 209-210.

<sup>53</sup> Dio XLVIII 10, 2; Appianus *B.C.* V, 20.

<sup>54</sup> Appianus *B.C.* V, 20.

<sup>55</sup> Tacitus *Hist.* I, 87.

<sup>56</sup> Tacitus *Hist.* I, 87 and II, 12-14.



had become we are justifiably surprised at Caesar's reluctance to safeguard these routes.<sup>57</sup> From Caesar's publications we see that he did understand the importance of safe passage through the Alps, but also that he was aware that putting this into effect required the total subjection of the Alpine tribes.<sup>58</sup> We have seen in the foregoing that these tribes considered passage through their territories to be tantamount to occupation and reacted accordingly.<sup>59</sup> Caesar simply did not have the time to such an operation because the civil war with Pompey and the later campaigns in Africa and Spain required his full attention.

Caesar's death at the hands of the murderous conspirators heralded liberty, freedom and death to tyranny!; nevertheless several Roman generals carried out military actions in the Alps in the ensuing civil war. Our sources give us reason to believe that the reasons why these generals waged war against the Alpine tribes differed one from another. Decimus Brutus saw it purely as a means of battle-training for his soldiers.<sup>60</sup> L. Antonius had other reasons: he stayed in the Alps in order to lay a formal claim to a triumph<sup>61</sup>—undeserved according to Dio.<sup>62</sup> The marauding expeditions of the Salassi—a mountain tribe in the region of the passes of the Great and the Little Saint Bernard<sup>63</sup>—and the Alpine tribes of the Taurisci, Liburni and Iapudes in the north of Italy, were so serious that Octavianus decided not to go to Africa but rather to defend the inhabitants against these tribes.<sup>64</sup> Octavianus himself advanced in the year 35 B.C. against the Iapudes and delegated the fight against the other mountain tribes to his generals.<sup>65</sup> The battle against the Salassi took the form of driving this mountain tribe back to its original hunting grounds.<sup>66</sup> How can we otherwise explain the fact that one year later the same Salassi again offered battle to

<sup>57</sup> Appianus *Ill.* 15.

<sup>58</sup> Caesar, *B. G.* III, 1.

<sup>59</sup> Caesar, *B. G.* III, 2, the tribes concerned are the Veragri and Seduni.

<sup>60</sup> Cicero, *Ep. ad Fam.* XI, 4.

<sup>61</sup> Cicero, *Ep. ad Fam.* X, 33, 4; X, 34, 1 and Acta Triumphorum, CIL I,

p. 461.

<sup>62</sup> Dio XLVIII 4, 2-4.

<sup>63</sup> Strabo IV, 6, 7.

<sup>64</sup> Dio XLIX 34, 1-2.

<sup>65</sup> Dio XLIX 35, 1.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. supra note 4 (chasing the Ligurians back to the mountains).

Valerius Messalla? <sup>67</sup> He succeeded in subduing them but only for the time being as is shown by the fact that de Salassi revolted again in the year 26 B.C.<sup>68</sup>

The campaign in northern Italy in 35 B.C. was not necessarily punitive, as we can see from the following. After Octavianus had succeeded in conquering the Iapudes he continued his campaign in the same year into the territory of the Pannonians. Dio, who condemned this invasion unreservedly, claims that Octavianus attacked these people as a means of battle-training for his soldiers.<sup>69</sup> Needless to mention the battle against the Salassi, Taurisci, Liburni, and Iapudes that immediately preceded the Pannonian war was also used to provide Octavianus' soldiers with the same training.

We have reason to believe that apart from the campaigns of 35 and 34 B.C., a third campaign against the Salassi was carried out at some period between 44 and 34 B.C.<sup>70</sup> The Roman general Antistius Vetus spent two years fighting against this mountain tribe in their own territory. Just after Vetus had the Salassi more or less under his control, he was called back by Octavianus who wished to assemble all his forces for his coming battle against Antony. Shortly after Vetus' departure the Salassi once again took over control of their own territory.<sup>71</sup>

The main characteristic common to all the above mentioned expeditions is their provisional nature; apparently the Romans carried out military actions usually as a means of exercising their soldiers or in order to give them reason to celebrate a triumph. Another reason for Octavianus to attack the Salassi in the year 35 B.C. was their refusal to pay the taxes levied upon them, a custom usually

<sup>67</sup> Dio XLIX 38, 8.

<sup>68</sup> Dio LIII 25, 2.

<sup>69</sup> Dio XLIX 36, 1, ἐπει δ' οὖν οὗτοι τε ἀπωλώλεσαν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι κατεστράφατο μὴδὲν ἀξιόλογον πράξαντες, ἐπὶ Παννονίους ἐπεστράτευσεν, ἐγκλημα μὲν οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς ἐπιφέρων, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' ἡδίκητό τι ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἵνα δὲ δὴ τοὺς στρατιώτας ἀσκή τε ἅμα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλοτριῶν τρέφῃ . . .

<sup>70</sup> Appianus III., 17. Vetus fought the Salassi during two years; later the Salassi were beaten by Messalla; i.e. Vetus was active in the Salassi territory, in any case two years prior to the action of Messalla (34 B.C.). For a different view cf. I. Beretta, *La Romanizzazione della Valle d'Aosta* (Varese-Milano, 1954), p. 17.

<sup>71</sup> Appianus III., 17.

imposed by the Romans on defeated peoples.<sup>72</sup> Having once imposed a tax on a country, the Romans did not always see to it that the inhabitants were compelled to make the regular payments.<sup>73</sup> The Salassi and a number of British tribes are cases in point in this respect. In 54 B.C. Caesar departed from England without having achieved total subjection of the inhabitants;<sup>74</sup> although he had left no soldiers behind he nevertheless imposed an annual tax on these tribes.<sup>75</sup> When in 25 B.C. these tribes no longer felt obliged to consider themselves as being subject to Rome, Augustus considered marching against them because of this.<sup>76</sup> The Romans obviously saw this imposition of taxes as a means to an end: should they so desire they always had a reason for taking up arms against tribes who refused to pay. Taking the Salassi as an example, we may conclude that most of the tribes in the Western Alps were in the same position of being on the periphery of the influence of the Roman policy in the period of 44 to 31 B.C.

After Augustus had become Princeps, he was able to concentrate all his attention on incorporating the mountain tribes in the area of the Western Alps, who were an isolated and independent group surrounded on all sides by Roman territory.<sup>77</sup> He also decided to settle the question of the Alpine routes once and for all.<sup>78</sup> In order to make the routes through the Western Alps negotiable, it was necessary for him to combine his military actions with feats of engineering.<sup>79</sup> But his task did not end there, however. The creation of these Alpine routes brought about a radical change in the military situation, and this of course was another problem to solve. Alpine routes providing trouble free access were after all a danger to the safety of Italy as compared to the extremely difficult routes that had hitherto been the only means of access. A number of sources suggest that the incorporation of the Western Alps by Augustus was

<sup>72</sup> Dio XLIX 34, 1-3; cf. Caesar *B. G.* I, 38, 3-5.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. Appianus *Ill.*, 28.

<sup>74</sup> Tacitus, *Agricola* 13. " . . . potest videri ostendisse posteris, non tradidisse . . . "

<sup>75</sup> Caesar *B. G.* V, 23, 1 and 22, 4.

<sup>76</sup> Dio LIII 15, 2.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. Ammianus Marcellinus XV 10, 2.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. Velleius Paterculus II 90, 1 and Strabo IV 6, 6.

<sup>79</sup> Strabo IV 6, 6.

the result of a large-scale campaign.<sup>80</sup> Let us now try to trace the duration of this campaign.

The Western Alps and the Poenine Alps separate the Roman province of Narbonese Gaul from Northern Italy.<sup>81</sup> In this part of Transalpine Gaul, which had been under Roman influence for quite some time, colonisation had been carried on on a large scale before 31 B.C.<sup>82</sup> It consequently seems rather strange that this province together with neighbouring provinces in Gaul and Spain was under the direct rule of the princeps in 27 B.C.<sup>83</sup> Augustus was responsible for those provinces where it was felt military presence was necessary, such as border provinces and provinces that had recently been conquered.<sup>84</sup> Dio gives us a very accurate description of the two criteria used to determine which provinces were to be controlled by Augustus.<sup>85</sup> Dio tells us that those provinces requiring military presence for the preservation of law and order were controlled directly by Augustus. This was certainly no reason for sending troops to Narbonese Gaul. Another criterion mentioned by Dio was the close proximity of tribes that had not yet been conquered. This was in all probability the reason why troops were sent to Narbonese Gaul. The eastern border of this province was formed by the Cottian, Graian and Poenine Alps which were probably still inhabited by independent tribes in 27 B.C.<sup>86</sup> Augustus proposed to the senate that the above-mentioned distinction be made between senatorial and imperial provinces and at the same time assured the senators that he would do his utmost to achieve law and order in the imperial provinces in order, where possible, to enable them to take over control of these provinces.<sup>87</sup> We may therefore assume with a reasonable degree of certainty that when in 22 B.C. Augustus handed over control of Narbonese Gaul to the senate because

<sup>80</sup> Velleius Paterculus II 90, 1; Strabo IV 6, 6; Appianus *Ill.*, 15.

<sup>81</sup> *Westermanns Grosser Atlas zur Weltgeschichte*, 36.

<sup>82</sup> B. H. Isaac, *Colonia Munatia Triumphalis and Legio Nona Triumphalis? Talanta III* (1972) p. 37.

<sup>83</sup> Dio LIII 12, 5-7.

<sup>84</sup> Dio LIII 12, 2-4.

<sup>85</sup> Dio LIII 12, 2.

<sup>86</sup> The definitive subjection of the tribes in the west Alps was not yet a fact in the year 31 B.C. (see *supra* p. 11).

<sup>87</sup> Dio LIII 13, 1.

“military presence was no longer required”, the army had already fulfilled its task.<sup>88</sup>

In conclusion, we can say that the foregoing gives us reason to believe that the mountain tribes in the Cottian, Graian and Poenine Alps had been conquered by the Romans stationed in Narbonese Gaul from 27 to 22 B.C. It is surely more by design than by accident that the campaign against the Salassi in 26 B.C. resulting in their total subjection in 25 B.C.<sup>89</sup> falls within this chronological framework. This subjection was indeed utter and complete: practically the entire male population was sent to the slave market.<sup>90</sup>

Dio tells us that when Terentius Varro attacked the Salassi in 25 B.C. “he attacked them simultaneously from various points so as to prevent the Salassi from concentrating their defences at one specific point”.<sup>91</sup> The northern border of the Salassi territory was formed by the territories of the Seduni, Veragri and Nantuates while the western border was formed by the territory of the Ceutrones.<sup>92</sup> Bearing this in mind and taking account of what Dio tells us, it is more than likely that Varro had to pass through these territories in order to attack the Salassi from several points at once. There is no record of the Ceutrones offering any opposition to the Romans. We do know, however, that Augustus did conquer the Seduni, Veragri and Nantuates.<sup>93</sup> In honour of the successful

<sup>88</sup> Dio LIV 4, 1.

<sup>89</sup> Dio LIII 25, 2-4; Strabo IV 6, 7; Livius *Per.* CXXXV, where the word “perdomiti” is used, whereas the action of Appius Claudius against the Salassi (143-141 B.C.) is described as: “Salassi . . . . . domuit”.

<sup>90</sup> Strabo IV 6,7. Dio LIII 25, 4.

<sup>91</sup> Dio LIII 25, 3.

<sup>92</sup> Strabo IV 6, 6. Caesar *B. G.* III 1, 1.

<sup>93</sup> Cf. Plinius *N.H.* 136-137 and Stähelin, *op. cit.* p. 105. With respect to the inscription CIL XII, 136 (E. Howald, E. Meyer, *Die römische Schweiz* (Zürich, 1940), no. 37) to be dated in the year 6-8 A.D. the following may be said. On this inscription dedicated to Augustus, the latter is mentioned in his capacity of “patronus” of the Seduni. On the inscription CIL XII, 145 (Howald-Meyer no. 38) Augustus is mentioned as the “patronus” of the Nantuates. On the inscription P. Barocelli, *Inscriptiones Italiae* Vol. XI, regio XI, fasc. 1 (Roma, 1932), no. 6, Augustus is mentioned as the patron of the Salassi. From a paragraph in Cicero's *De Officiis* (I 35) it will be clear that this capacity of Augustus does not indicate a close personal relation between Augustus and the tribes mentioned: “. . . tum ii qui armis positis ad imperatoris fidem confugient, quamvis murum aries percusserit,

completion of the extensive military actions by Augustus, a triumphal arch was erected in the Alps at the command of the senate in 25 B.C.<sup>94</sup>

From the text of the Tropaeum Alpium<sup>95</sup> we conclude that not all the tribes of the Western Alps were conquered by force. This monument erected during the reign of Augustus bore the inscription saved for posterity by Pliny.<sup>96</sup> In this text mention is made of "Gentes devictae" and "Gentes sub imperium populi Romani redactae". We note with some surprise that the "Gentes devictae" do not contain all the tribes who inhabited the Western Alps;<sup>97</sup> yet we know that the other tribes must also have lost their independence. If we assume that these tribes surrendered without a fight, the difference between the "Gentes devictae" and the "Gentes redactae" becomes clear: the term "Gentes sub imperium populi Romani redactae" refers both to the tribes which had been conquered by force and to those which had surrendered without a fight. This is illustrated by the fact that King Cottius' tribes are not mentioned under the "Gentes devictae" whereas he was indeed subject to Augustus.<sup>98</sup>

Now that we have seen that the period from 27 to 22 B.C. can be considered as a chronological framework for the subjection of the territory of the Western Alps, we should consider in more detail the geographical framework. Geographically speaking, Narbonese Gaul was an ideal starting point for attacks on the Alpine tribes. We have already seen that in 57 B.C. the Nantuates, Veragri and Seduni were

recipiendi. In quo tantopere apud nostros iustitia culta est ut ii qui civitates aut nationes devictas bello in fidem recepissent, earum patroni essent more maiorum". From this passage it is clear that in Cicero's time it was still a formal procedure that the Roman commander took the position of "patronus" with respect to the tribes subdued by him. Quite in accordance with this procedure Augustus became the "patronus" of the tribes subjected by commanders operating under his supervision, as has been proved by the fact that Terentius Varro subjected the Salassi and Augustus became their "patronus". The inscriptions found in the territory of the abovementioned tribes confirm the fact that these tribes have been subjected by Augustus, and do not testify to a special interest of Augustus for these tribes.

<sup>94</sup> Dio LIII 26, 5.

<sup>95</sup> See *infra* appendix.

<sup>96</sup> Plinius *N.H.*, III 136-137.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. the Graioceli mentioned in Caesar *B. G.* I, 10, 4.

<sup>98</sup> Ammianus Marcellinus XV 10, 2; Plinius *N.H.* III, 138.

attacked from Narbonese Gaul.<sup>99</sup> Furthermore, Caesar's *Commentarii* reveal that the Seduni and Veragri were afraid of being taken over as part of Narbonese Gaul,<sup>100</sup> this was probably due to its geographical position. The conquering of the mountain tribes in the Alpine regions was a first essential step prior to the building of roads. Augustus built roads along the former Alpine routes to tie up with the road network started by Agrippa in 20 B.C. in Gaul.<sup>101</sup>

It is now worth considering whether or not the foundation of a number of colonies by Augustus in the immediate vicinity of the Western Alps in the period from 27 to 22 B.C. can be related to the conquering of this area. In 30 B.C. Augustus sent the remaining veterans of the former Legio VIII to Forum Iulii. The colony was known officially as "Colonia Octavianorum Pacensis Classica". The word "classica" indicates that Augustus established a naval base in this colony.<sup>102</sup> This was the only military-like town situated along the Massilian and Ligurian coast road. There is a distinct possibility that this colony had a twofold strategic meaning: as a naval base and as a means of controlling the Massilian and Ligurian coast road. The geographical position of the territory facilitated this task.<sup>103</sup> We have only to think of Otho's attempts to gain control over Forum Iulii.<sup>104</sup>

Three years later, Colonia Augusta Taurinorum was founded at the foot of the Alps along the road from Italy to Gaul via the Mount Genève.<sup>105</sup> This had been the former site of a town whose inhabitants had offered resistance to Hannibal's army.<sup>106</sup> This

<sup>99</sup> F. Stähelin, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

<sup>100</sup> Caesar *B. G.* III, 2.

<sup>101</sup> Strabo IV 6, 6, and 11; E. Meyer, *Neuere Forschungsergebnisse zur Geschichte der Schweiz in römischer Zeit*, Jb. SGU 54 (1968/69), p. 77, fig. 3.

<sup>102</sup> Kornemann in *RE* IV s.v. Coloniae p. 69 and F. Vittinghoff, *Römische Kolonisation und Bürgerrechtspolitik* (Wiesbaden, 1951), p. 100.

<sup>103</sup> Cf. Strabo IV 1, 9; IV 6, 2 and IV 6, 3.

<sup>104</sup> The function of this colony seems to be confirmed by the fact that Otho intended to get hold of Forum Iulii by means of a surprise-attack, in accordance with his intention to get control of the Massilian and Ligurian coast road (Tacitus, *Hist.* II 12-15).

<sup>105</sup> Kornemann in *RE* IV s.v. Coloniae p. 536. "At the foot of the Alps". sub radicibus Alpium (Plinius *NH* III 123), and I. Beretta, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

<sup>106</sup> Polybius III 60, 8; Livius XXI 38, 5-8.

colony also afforded an excellent means of controlling the access roads via Mount Genève, and this is probably the main reason why Augustus founded this colony. Summarising it may be concluded that chronologically and geographically seen the foundation of the colonies Forum Iulii and Colonia Augusta Taurinorum is not too far outside the chronological (27-22 B.C.) and geographical (situation along the routes) scope of pacification to be connected with it. When considering the relatively early date of the foundation of Forum Iulii it should be remembered that the foundation of this colony needed not be preceded by the subjection of the surrounding territory, since the Massilian and Ligurian coast road has been passable since the middle of the second century B.C.<sup>107</sup>

In the year 25 B.C.<sup>108</sup> the colony *Colonia Augusta Praetoria* was founded near the place where the road from Eporedia splitted up; northwards the road continued via the pass of the Great St. Bernard and westwards via the Little St. Bernard to Gallia.<sup>109</sup> According to Konrad Kraft the adjective *praetoria* in the official name of the colony indicates that praetorians have been deduced to the colony.<sup>110</sup> Strabo mentions the deduction of 3000 Romans to Augusta Praetoria.<sup>111</sup> Dio speaks of the deduction of "δορυφόρων" to Αὔγουστα Πραιτοριανῶν.<sup>112</sup> For a better understanding of the function of the colony it may be relevant to investigate the origin of the colonists.

In the later Republic the *cohors praetoria* was an army-corps which, at crucial moments in the battle under the command of the commander-in-chief, forced the break-through or gave a decisive turn to the battle.<sup>113</sup> An example of it is given by Sallustius in the description of the battle of Pistoria against Catilina. At the crucial moment the legate M. Petreius directed the attack with the *cohors praetoria* on the centre of the Catilina army, as a result of which

<sup>107</sup> See supra pp. 50-51.

<sup>108</sup> Dio LIII 25, 5.

<sup>109</sup> Strabo IV 6, 7 and IV 6, 11. I. Beretta, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

<sup>110</sup> K. Kraft, *Die Rolle der Colonia Iulia Equestris*, Jb. RGZM Mainz 4 (1957), p. 96.

<sup>111</sup> Strabo IV 6, 7.

<sup>112</sup> Dio LIII 25, 5. For the different ways of writing the name of the colony see Hülsen in *RE* II s.v. Augusta, p. 2346.

<sup>113</sup> See infra note 136.



the enemy front collapsed.<sup>114</sup> In this way Caesar named his legion X his *cohors praetoria* in the year 58 B.C., since this army-corps saved the situation at a series of critical moments.<sup>115</sup> According to A. Passerini, author of *Le Coorti Pretorie*, the above-mentioned action of the *cohors praetoria* characterizes the function of this corps in the later Republic.<sup>116</sup> A general description of the tasks of the *cohors praetoria* in the early Republic, as well as the principle according to which this army-corps was composed, is given by Festus together with information about the pay.<sup>117</sup> Although the task of the *cohors praetoria* in the early Republic differed from that in later times, the principle of selection and the relatively high payment have been maintained.<sup>118</sup> In the later Republic the praetorian cohort consisted of the best military men selected from the army units of a general. The members of this élite-regiment received a higher payment than the common soldiers and had special privileges.<sup>119</sup> In the later Republic it was also common use that one general had one *cohors praetoria*. However, in the period of the second triumvirate—and especially after the year 42 B.C.—some commanders prove to have more than one *cohors praetoria*.<sup>120</sup> Changing over from one single *cohors praetoria* to a multiple of *cohortes praetoriae* occurs in the period after Caesar's death and prior to the battle of Actium.

In this uncertain period during which almost all political decisions were a result of military pressure, the soldiers who had fought under Caesar played an important roll, not only as a group having the same interest, but also as the only military men with

<sup>114</sup> For the context of this battle see M. Cary, *CAH*, IX pp. 501-502. For throwing in the *cohors praetoria* in the battle, see Sallustius, *Bellum Catilinae* 60, 5.

<sup>115</sup> For the action of Legio X at critical moments see J. G. P. Best, *Colonia Iulia Equestris and Legio Decima Equestris*, *Talanta* III (1972), p. 5. For the denomination, Caesar *B. G. I.*, 40, 14.

<sup>116</sup> A. Passerini, *Le Coorti Pretorie* (Roma, 1939), p. 38.

<sup>117</sup> W. M. Lindsay, *Sexti Pompei Festi, de verborum significatu quae supersunt cum Pauli epitome* (Leipzig, 1913), p. 249. "Praetoria cohors est dicta, quod a praetore non discedebat. Scipio enim Africanus primus fortissimum quemque delegit, qui ab eo in bello non discederent et cetero munere militiae vacarent et sesquiplez stipendium acciperent."

<sup>118</sup> A. Passerini, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

<sup>119</sup> A. Passerini, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39.

<sup>120</sup> See *infra* pp. 65-66

war-experience at the moment. In the year 44 B.C. almost all legionaries in active service were soldiers who had fought under Caesar. In addition, in various recently founded colonies there still were veterans who had won their spurs already when serving under Caesar, prior to the year 44 B.C. The history of the legions X and IX demonstrates that a number of veterans were not yet served-out soldiers.<sup>121</sup> Our sources occasionally mention the superiority of these veterans—anyhow in the first years after 44 B.C.—as compared with the recruits who recently joined the army.<sup>122</sup> The armies operating in the beginning of the civil war consisted mostly of Caesarian veterans, i.e. legions that had fought under Caesar and legions of recently incorporated soldiers.<sup>123</sup> In this situation it was attractive for Caesar's veterans to enter the battle in their former formations.<sup>124</sup> This is shown clearly in the battle of Forum Gallorum where Caesar's veterans, partly in the *cohortes praetoriae* of Antonius and partly in those of Octavianus, entered into battle quite separately and independent of the other army-corps.<sup>125</sup> For Caesar's veterans serving in the *cohortes praetoriae* of the various commanders was attractive, inter alia because of the higher wages.<sup>126</sup> For the commanders it was important to engage these soldiers in view of their fighting qualities, in a period in which the general with the best army had, also politically, the strongest position.

As a result of this interaction the size of the *cohortes praetoriae* of the various commanders must have increased considerably. At any rate Appianus speaks at a certain moment of a *cohors praetoria* of 2000 men.<sup>127</sup> After the battle of Philippi the number of veterans willing to remain in military service was so large that by incorporating all these soldiers in one *cohors praetoria* a tactically useless army-corps would be made. The possibility of fast and quick-

<sup>121</sup> Cf. Appianus *B.C.* III 46.

<sup>122</sup> Cf. Appianus *B.C.* III 68, 69.

<sup>123</sup> Cf. Appianus *B.C.* III 45, 69.

<sup>124</sup> Cf. Appianus *B.C.* III 45-46.

<sup>125</sup> Appianus *B.C.* III 67; the behaviour of the praetorians proves that they were veterans indeed.

<sup>126</sup> H. Botermann, *Die Soldaten und die römische Politik in der Zeit von Caesars Tod bis zur Gründung des zweiten Triumvirats*, Zetemata Heft 46 (München, 1968), p. 44.

<sup>127</sup> Appianus *B.C.* IV 115. For commentary on this paragraph see A. Passerini, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

wittedly manoeuvring a not further sub-divided army-corps of 4000 men is extremely limited.<sup>128</sup> Therefore, in this situation the incorporation of this large number of veterans in a number of separate *cohortes praetoriae* was obvious. After the year 42 B.C. it turns out that Antonius and Octavianus each had several *cohortes praetoriae* at their disposal.<sup>129</sup> As far as Octavianus is concerned, we get the impression that the atmosphere of confidence which used to exist between the commander and his *cohors praetoria* continued to exist after the year 42 B.C. between Octavianus and his combined *cohortes praetoriae*, because in the year 41 B.C. he commanded these *cohortes* personally during the battle of Perugia against L. Antonius.<sup>130</sup> Also the fact that Augustus afterwards stationed exclusively his praetorians as the only military force in Italy, proves more than clearly his confidence specially in these forces.<sup>131</sup>

The deduction of 3000 former praetorians to Augusta Praetoria<sup>132</sup> gives a clear indication of the value Augustus attached to putting the routes across the Great and the Little St. Bernard under the guard of his most reliable forces. This policy of Augustus is analogous to that of Caesar with respect to the colonies *Raurica* and *Julia Equestris*, since Caesar had deduced his *decumani* and *nonani* to these strategically important colonies.<sup>133</sup> The consequences of the foundation of *Colonia Augusta Praetoria* in the territory of the Salassi after the defeat of this mountain-tribe, were as follows:<sup>134</sup> After the surrender of the Salassi to the Roman commander Terentius Varro in 25 B.C., the latter succeeded in a tricky way of taking prisoner the complete male population. The total yield in this tactical move was sold "sub hasta" on the market of the

<sup>128</sup> If it is assumed that for the division at Philippi (Appianus *B.C.*, V, 3) Octavianus still disposed of a part of his previous *cohors praetoria*, then a higher number would have been reached, even if Octavianus was satisfied with a smaller part of the newly available praetorians.

<sup>129</sup> For Antonius see Plutarchus, *Ant.* 39, 2. For Octavianus see *infra* note 150.

<sup>130</sup> Appianus *B.C.*, V, 34.

<sup>131</sup> Tacitus *Ann.* IV 5, 5; Suetonius, *Aug.* XLIX 1.

<sup>132</sup> See *supra* p. 63.

<sup>133</sup> J. P. G. Best, *art. cit.*, p. 8; Isaac, B. H., *art. cit.*, pp. 26-27.

<sup>134</sup> For the integration of the pacified Salassi in the Roman colony, cf. a forthcoming publication of the present author.

neighbouring Epedia.<sup>135</sup> Although this information of Strabo is not entirely satisfactory, it shows that Augustus did not intend to allow the Salassi to go on living as an ethnical entity. On the basis of his experiences with this mountain-tribe it would have been too risky to allow the Salassi after their subjection to continue living as an integral nation near the routes across the Great and Little St. Bernard, which routes they used to control.<sup>136</sup>

Although Augustus did not intend to allow the Salassi to continue living as an ethnical entity, the formulation of the inscription which is to be dated in the year 23/22 B.C. "... Salassi incolae qui initio se in coloniam contulerunt ..." proves that the Salassi were saved from a complete extirpation.<sup>137</sup> Beretta supposes that, just as in the case of the Raeti after their subjection, a sufficient number of Salassi were kept alive to enable the tribe to survive, but too little, however, to spark off a revolt.<sup>138</sup> If the remaining Salassi, just as so many romanized mountain-tribes, have dedicated themselves to agriculture after their subjection and descended to the valley, the situation of the colony offered a suitable possibility for keeping the new farmers under control,<sup>139</sup> since *Colonia Augusta Praetoria* was situated on the place of Varro's former castra in the still fertile valley of the Dora Baltea.<sup>140</sup> The strategic position of the colony with respect to the passes is described pithily by Plinius with the words: "... Augusta Praetoria, iuxta geminas Alpium fores, Graias atque Poeninas".<sup>141</sup>

#### APPENDIX

In the year 7/6 B.C. a monument was erected near to-day's La Tourbie in honour of the conquests of Augustus on the Alpine tribes.

<sup>135</sup> Dio LIII 25, 4; Strabo IV 6, 7.

<sup>136</sup> This is made probable by the behaviour of the Salassi towards the Romans, when the mountain-tribe still controlled the Alpine routes in their territory.

<sup>137</sup> See supra note 108. For the position of the Salassi as *incolae* of the Roman colony see supra note 134.

<sup>138</sup> This is deemed probable by Beretta, based on Dio LIV 22 (I. Beretta, *op. cit.*, p. 21).

<sup>139</sup> Cf., for instance, the Allobroges (Strabo IV 1, 11).

<sup>140</sup> For the foundation of *Colonia Augusta Praetoria* on the place of Varro's castra see Strabo IV 6, 7.

<sup>141</sup> Plinius, *N.H.* III, 123.

This monument is known by the name of Tropaeum Alpium.<sup>142</sup> The inscription on it mentions the result of Augustus' activities in the Alps. Although only fragments of the original text have remained, the complete text, which, however, needs some correction,<sup>143</sup> has been transmitted in Plinius' *Naturalis Historia* (III 136-137).

The specific character of this text engraved on the Tropaeum Alpium is that it can be divided in two parts. The second part of the inscription consists of quite a number of names of Alpine tribes, qualified as *gentes devictae*. There are different theories concerning the meaning of this enumeration in the whole of the text and the conclusions that may be connected with the order of sequence applied in the list of these tribes. One of these theories is that from the order of sequence in which said tribes are mentioned, the year of their subjection by Augustus may be derived,<sup>144</sup> based on the expeditions undertaken in the Eastern Alps (16 and 15 B.C.) and against the Liguras Comati (14 B.C.).<sup>145</sup> Unless the year of subjection is known exactly from other sources—just as in the case of the Salassi—the subjection of the relevant tribes is dated in the years 16, 15, 14 B.C. respectively, according to the probable living area of the tribes.<sup>146</sup>

In the following paragraphs we shall see whether the meaning of this enumeration justifies the drawing of the above-mentioned (and other comparable) conclusions against the background of the complete text of the Tropaeum Alpium. For a proper understanding it is indispensable to compare the text of the Tropaeum Alpium with a number of texts which, qua character, could be indicated for this purpose and which, chronologically seen, were not too far away from the Augustan period. In the temple dedicated by Pompeius to Minerva the following text has been engraved: "Cn. Pompeius Magnus imperator bello XXX annorum confecto fuis fugatis occisis in deditionem acceptis hominum centiens viciens semel

<sup>142</sup> H. Philipp, in *RE* VIIA s.v. Tropaea Augusti, pp. 661-662.

<sup>143</sup> J. Formigé, *Le Trophée des Alpes. Fouilles et Monuments archéologiques en France métropolitaine* (Supplément à Gallia II), Paris, 1949, p. 58.

<sup>144</sup> Howald-Meyer, p. 195; E. Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 75, note 13.

<sup>145</sup> J. Formigé, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-61.

<sup>146</sup> J. Formigé, *ibidem*.

LXXXIII depressis aut captis navibus DCCCXLVI oppidis castellis MDXXXVIII in fidem receptis terris a Maeotis ad Rubrum mare subactis votum merito Minervae".<sup>147</sup>

In the year 51/52 A.D. a triumphal arch was erected in Rome, in honour of Claudius' conquest of England;<sup>148</sup> on this arch the following text has been written:<sup>149</sup>

TI · CLAVdio drusi f. caiSARI  
 AVGVsto germaniCO  
 PONTIFICi maximo trib. potes TAT.XI  
 COS. V · IMP. xxi(?) patri pa TRIAI  
 SENATVS · POPulusque · ROManus qVOD  
 REGES · BRIT anniai XI deuictos sine  
 VLLA · IACTVra in deditionem acceperit  
 GENTESQVE · Barbaras trans oceanum  
 PRIMVS · IN DICionem populi romani redegerit

For the emperor Titus an arch was erected in Rome a few decennia later, i.e. in the year 81 A.D.,<sup>150</sup> on which the following text has been written:

SENATVS · POPVLVSQ · ROMANVS  
 IMP · TITO · CAESARI · DIVI · VESPASIANI · F · VESPASIAN o · AVGVSTO  
 PONTIF · MAX · TRIB · POT · X X · IMP · XVII · c OS · VIII · P · P · PRINCIPI · SVO  
 QVOD · PRAECEPTIS · PATRIis · CONSILIIISQ · ET · AVSPICIIIS · GENTEM  
 IVDAEORVM · DOMVIT · ET · VRBEM · HIERVSOLYMAM · OMNIBVS · ANTE  
 SE · DVCIBVS · REGIBVS · GENTIBVS · AVT · FRVSTRA · PETITAM · AVT  
 OMNINO · INTEMPTATAM · DELEVIT

All the texts cited have in common that only the result of several years of fighting—in the inscription of Pompeius even 30 years—is mentioned, whereas any concrete indication as to the development of the events or their chronological order is completely missing. Instead of this, extra emphasis is given to the cited results, by means of certain additions and stylistic expressions; in the case of the inscription of Pompeius by means of a series impressive figures, in the case of the Claudian arch by the additions as "sine ulla

<sup>147</sup> Plinius *N.H.* VII 97.

<sup>148</sup> H. Kähler, in *RE* VII A. s.v. Triumph-bogen, p. 384.

<sup>149</sup> *CIL* VI 920.

<sup>150</sup> H. Kähler, in *RE* VII A. s.v. Triumph-bogen, p. 385.

iactura" and "primus" and in the case of the arch of Titus by the conclusion "omnibus ante se . . . intemptatam . . .".<sup>151</sup>

Now that we have seen that in texts in which military facts are memorized the entire emphasis is given to the final success, and since we have seen also in which way this emphasis is laid, it will be worthwhile looking once again at the text of the Tropaeum Alpium. In this text too the final result of Augustus' campaigns in the Alps is mentioned, in the following words: "... gentes Alpinae omnes quae a mari supero ad inferum pertinebant sub imperium populi Romani sunt redactae . . .". It seems probable that in the text of the Tropaeum the element of the extra emphasis on the memorized result is also present. In connection herewith it may have sense to see what is the intended effect of the earlier mentioned enumeration of *gentes devictae* in the text of the Tropaeum. This can be done with the aid of a number of inscriptions from the Augustan period, which equally mention a series of tribes.

In the Eastern Alps area an inscription has been found from the period 11-2 B.C., dedicated to Iulia by eight Alpine tribes mentioned by name.<sup>152</sup> On the arch which was erected in Susa in the year 9/8 B.C., in honour of Augustus, the names of fourteen Alpine tribes have been engraved.<sup>153</sup> We know that on the altar erected at Lugdunum in honour of Augustus an inscription has been written. Strabo explicitly mentions that this inscription contained the names of sixty Gallic tribes.<sup>154</sup> Since in the above-mentioned examples the enumeration of tribes cannot be related to a specific historical event, it is probable that in all these inscriptions a stylistic device has been applied which aimed simply at the effect. This method which was used on a large scale neither before nor after the Augustan period, must have been, therefore, a timebound usage.

Since the series of names on the Tropaeum Alpium is not in any way connected with information regarding Augustus' campaigns in the Alps, it seems that a long enumeration of names merely

<sup>151</sup> CIL VI 944.

<sup>152</sup> E. Meyer, *Neuere Forschungsergebnisse über die Schweiz in römischer Zeit* M.H. 19 (1962), p. 141.

<sup>153</sup> CIL V 7231.

<sup>154</sup> Strabo IV 3, 2.

aimed at the effect which Pompeius tried to achieve by enumerating impressive series of figures. Drawing conclusions on the chronological sequence in the conquest of Alpine tribes, from the order in which these tribes are indicated on the Tropaeum Alpium, is as irrelevant as drawing chronological conclusions from the order of sequence in which Pompeius has had his heroic achievements described: it is evident that by applying such a procedure to the interpretation of Pompeius' inscription, one merely violates the historical facts.

March 1972.